**Humanitarian Diplomacy and the United Nations**

**Elliot K. Ngosa**

**SN/385/08/2019**

**Strategia Netherlands International Centre for Business, Humanitarian and**

**Development Training**

**Assignment no. Four**

**Date Submitted 11th February, 2020**

# INTRODUCTION

This essay attempts to outline Humanitarian Diplomacy and how it functions in international cooperation. We begin by spelling out the five generic conditions that the Secretary General of the United Nations has to fulfill in order to apply the preventive treatments effectively. We then define terrorism in a global context. After a definition on terrorism, we highlight the challenges terrorism poses to the work and understanding of humanitarianism. We then turn our discussion towards the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Under this discussion, we highlight the disaster’s social and economic impact on the region and subsequently bring into focus the response of countries that were affected beyond the Indian Ocean region. Subsequently, this will lead to a presentation on the challenges national and international organizations faced, in providing humanitarian relief. We then zero in on the lessons learned from the international response to this disaster. In the final discussion, we introduce the partnership between EU and U.S. We examine the nature of this cooperation in the light of its contribution to the global economy, humanitarian policy and a coherent humanitarian system. We then conclude with a presentation on what this cooperation can bring to the humanitarian world if the corporation is enhanced.

**The United Nation’s mandate in view of Conflict**

Essentially, there are five generic conditions to be fulfilled for the Secretary General of the UN to be able to apply the preventive treatments successfully. However, we need to understand where the UN derives its mandate to create peace, prevent conflict and subsequently empower the Secretary General to act as he does in the face of global conflicts.

The United Nations Department for Political Affairs (2006) says thus:

The role of the Secretary-General as a peace-making actor derives from the Charter of the United Nations. Importantly, the Secretary-General supports the Security Council in its efforts to promote the “pacific settlement of disputes”, in line with its mandate under Chapter VI of the Charter (p. 2).

It is very clear from the UN Charter that, “preventing conflict between states has been a central aim of the United Nations (UN) since the end of World War II” (Anderlini & Stanski, 2004, p. 1). This position is underscored in the UN Charter as a core of the whole UN system (United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 2006). Furthermore, it is in line with the declaration of the General Assembly of 5th December, 1988 which affirmed the prevention of aggravation of disputes in the international relations of states (Module 4, nd). Let us now outline the five conditions that the Secretary General needs to fulfil in order for him to apply the preventive treatment efficiently.

**The Five Conditions for Preventive Treatment**

The first condition is that, the Secretary General should have the capacity for gathering and analysing information. The analysis of information consists in identifying issues or indicators that underpin a conflict and conditions that lessen clashes and act as a basis for peace-building (Anderlini & Stanski, 2004). Albeit there are those who contend that the UN lacks an independent intelligence to collect and analyse information, the availability of information from the media, academics and Non-Governmental Organisations suffices for the Secretary General to carry out his functions as an actor of peace. A good example we can cite here is the action taken by the Secretary General in 1992, where he created a warning system. This was in the wake of collecting and analysing information. This decision he took was to bring all the secretariat’s political work into a single department of political affairs (Module 4, nd)

The second condition is that the Secretary General should have the capability to recommend the correct treatment for the diagnosed problem (Module 4, nd). Let us examine a prominent event that might fit into this second condition and this is the case of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, which was triggered by the shooting down of the president’s plane. In the aftermath of the Genocide, the world indeed learnt hard lessons and so did the UN. The Secretary General prescribed fundamental steps that Rwanda needed to take as a remedy to healing a nation that was struggling with the horror of the Genocide. The need for security, justice and assistance to returnees were prescribed as necessary to facilitate healing and reconciliation (Benson & Macrae, 1996)

Other problems that the UN’s Secretary General is familiar with include fraud during elections, a sharp rise in the price of basic goods, political arrests to mention but a few (Anderlini & Stanski, 2004). In all these circumstance the Secretary General should be able to prescribe the best remedy for the wounded nations.

The third condition has to do with parties involved. Anderlini and Stanski, (2004) observe that there are essentially two categories of parties involved in the process of conflict resolution: the stake holders (parties to the conflict) and those who mediate and facilitate the process.

Essentially, the parties involved in the conflict should be ready to accept the course of action that the secretary general proposes. This is “a sine qua non because he has no power to impose any remedy on them and can act only with their consent” (Module 4, nd). Let us bring into focus the example El Salvador, where the UN convened parties involved in conflict, helped resolve obstacles and encouraged progress. Another example is the situation in Sierra Leone in 1996, where the Secretary General and his Special Representative (SRSG) worked in collaboration with the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to resolve the internal conflicts (Anderlini & Stanski, 2004). At various points of the cycle of conflict, the Secretary General engaged in a range of activities from mediation, facilitation, dialogue processes to arbitration (United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 2006) without imposing the course of action proposed (Module 4, nd).

The fourth condition for action is that the Secretary General after prescribing a preventive treatment and having involved the parties to accept it, must persuade the other member states and especially the members of the Security Council to give him political support (Module 4, nd.). This is in line with Article 99 of the UN Charter which provides that “the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that in his opinion may threaten international peace and security” (Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, p. 18).

The fifth condition is very much dependent on resources for the success of conflict resolution. When we talk of resources, this ranges from human, logistical to financial resources. The secretary general must persuade the members of states to provide the necessary resources to finance the agreed preventive action. Furthermore, he is given the mandate by article 99 of the UN Charter to carry out this mandate (Module 4, nd). This mandate is enhanced by the agreement of the world summit (2005) where member states committed themselves to preventing crimes against humanity (General Assembly, 2019).

Under this condition, the Secretary General requires concerted efforts from member states. Let us take the case of Yugoslavia in 1991 where there were fears that the conflict could have “domino effect and spread to the Southern Balkans, particularly Macedonia and Albania. In response to these warning signs, the UN deployed it’s ever prevention peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Prevention Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) to Macedonia in January 1993” (Anderlini & Stanski, 2004). This move was done was done at the call of the Secretary General.

We now highlight the phenomenon of terrorism; a threat that has become a huge concern for the international community.

**The Historical background of Terrorism**

As we try to define the term “Terrorism”; a term which has no definite definition, it is significant to look at this term from an historical point of view.

Friedlander (1976) says the following about Terrorism:

Terrorism was initially coined to describe the Reign of Terror, the period of the French Revolution from 5th September 1793 to 27July 1794, during which the Revolutionary Government directed violence and harsh measures against citizens suspected of being enemies of the Revolution. In turn, popular resistance to Napoleon’s invasion of the Spanish Peninsula led to a new form of fighter –the “guerrilla”, which derived from the Spanish word *guerra*, meaning “little war” (p. 52)

Parker and Sitter (2016) affirm that terrorism is motivated by four-goal oriented trends namely: nationalism, socialism, religious extremism and exclusionism. These are some of the underlying motivators of terrorism. With this historical background, we can now attempt to give a definition of Terrorism.

**The Definition of Terrorism**

First and foremost, the meaning of the term “Terrorism” and to whom it applies is so highly contested that even the International Humanitarian Law does not provide a clear cut definition (Muller, García, Deckmyn, Trobbiani, & Valenza, 2017). However terrorism is widely “understood as a method of coercion that utilizes or threatens to utilize violence in order to spread fear and thereby attain political or ideological goals” (Module 1, 2018)

Furthermore, the concept – terrorism – is used to describe violence orchestrated and perpetrated by either a state, individual or non-state groups (Pantuliano, Mackintosh, Elhawary & Metcalfe, 2011).

**The effects of Terrorism on Humanitarian Action**

There are many challenges terrorism poses to both the understanding and working of humanitarianism. These challenges are both long lasting and immediate. Furthermore, the challenges it poses are quite daunting in both magnitude and complexity (Muller et al., 2017) as we shall outline below.

Guided by the four fundamental principles of humanitarianism – neutrality, independence, impartiality and humanity – humanitarianism ensures that aid goes to vulnerable populations. However, terrorism violates these principles that facilitate humanitarianism. Apart from that, terrorism limits the ability of international organisations to implement humanitarian activities and programmes (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2018). For example, in regions where there is protracted complex conflicts, aid organisations find it very hard to both champion humanitarian principles and provide humanitarian assistance (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2018). To elaborate more on this aspect, let us take the case of Iraq as a good example of the point expressed above.

In Iraq, the concept of countering terrorism and all forms of extremism potentially has an adverse effect on the fundamental principle of independence. This is due to the fact that the principle of independence could be used to support a negative political narrative about certain groups (Norwegian Council of Refugees, 2018).

Terrorism creates other complex problems to humanitarian action. It increases risks for vulnerable populations and aid workers, on logistics and infrastructure. Apart from that, it violates human rights, fundamental principles of humanity and the objectives of international humanitarian law (Muller et al., 2017).

When we examine the scenario in the field; the situation is even grimmer. In contexts where terrorism is rife, there is a lot that is affected. Usually and in most cases, civilians are heavily affected, cities are reduced to rubble and there is a lot of human casualties. Furthermore, it causes massive disruption of humanitarian work and humanitarian supplies such as medical and food supplies. In addition to that, communication, transport and infrastructure, equally suffer destruction. Studies show that terrorism mostly targets these aspects in order to achieve its objectives. The consequence of this vice is that, vulnerable populations are deprived of supplies mentioned above. At times terrorism causes extreme damage to the extent that vulnerable populations are denied of humanitarian access (Muller et al., 2017).

**The application of Counter terrorism efforts**

In regions where terrorism is endemic, states in collaboration with international communities usually attempt to apply counter terrorism efforts. This approach is inevitable as most terrorist acts occur in areas where violent extremism is often present. This is the case in countries such as Mali, Nigeria and Somalia, where terrorist groups like Al Shabbab in Somalia and Boko Harram in Nigeria are very active and stubborn. Often in such places humanitarian actors usually apply principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality (Debarre, 2019).

However, in the application of these principles humanitarian assistance and protection is provided without any distinction other than need. However, even though international Humanitarian Law regulates the means of methods of warfare with comprehensive rules on hostilities; states are increasingly applying a counterterrorism framework to acts of violence committed in situations of armed conflict instead of International Humanitarian Law (Debarre, 2019).

However, the challenge is that counterterrorism frameworks have blurred the lines between armed conflict and terrorism. This situation creates a big challenge on the application of International Humanitarian Law. This further has an impact on the ability of Humanitarian actors to operate in such contexts which further restricts humanitarian access to populations in regions controlled by non-state armed groups (Debarre, 2019). Having presented the phenomenon of terrorism let us now engage in a discussion on the Tsunami and its impact.

**The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami**

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami which was caused by a 9.0 magnitude earthquake (Ramalanjaona, 2011) is described as unprecedented both in scale and in record (Oxfam Research Report, 2014). Reports reveal that the tsunami is the most devastating disaster in modern times affecting 18 countries in total; in the Southeast parts of Asia and Southern Africa. Furthermore, it left more than 250 000 people dead and more than 1.7 million homeless (Ramalanjaona, 2011).

An aftermath study reveals that in terms of lives lost and people missing, countries like Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand were the hardest hit. Towards the end of January, 2005, 40 other countries reported their missing citizens and another 12 countries more reported that their citizens were in the region of the Tsunami. The worst affected countries were Germany and Sweden outside the region that lost more than 500 citizens each ((Telford and Cosgrave, 2006). Having outlined the scale of destruction done by the tsunami, let us now delve into the social and economic impact of this natural disaster.

**Social and Economic Impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami**

To begin this study on the social and economic impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, we draw on the findings of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), a group of international donors that assessed the impact of this natural disaster on the human population. The bottom line is that the impact of this Tsunami was both enormous and mind boggling (Oxfam Research Report, 2014).

Furthermore, the Oxfam Research Report (2014), asserts that:

the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was an unprecedented event both in its scale and in the record level of private funding for the relief and recovery effort. An estimated $13.5bn in donations poured in from the international community with roughly 40 percent from private individuals and organizations – making the tsunami the highest-ever privately funded emergency, (p. 4).

Overall, the Tsunami had a huge social and economic impact on the affected countries more than any other natural disaster in the history of humanity. The Oxfam Research Report (2014) further reports that approximately five million people were in dire need of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, large populations were left vulnerable and in need of food, water and shelter. The most hit countries were low or middle-income countries. As we know, the worst thing about disasters hitting middle-income countries is that these countries tend to suffer more severely during humanitarian emergencies and take longer to recover (Oxfam Research Report, 2014).

In addition to that, most of these countries hit by the Tsunami were already dealing with widespread and deeply rooted social and economic challenges. Hence, the tsunami only compounded problems pertinent to poverty and inequality (Oxfam Research Report, 2014). Let us now outline the lessons learned from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.

**Challenges faced in the provision of Relief efforts – 2004 Tsunami disaster**

Prior to looking at the lessons learned from the 2004 Tsunami disaster, we need to analyse the challenges that assailed international organisations and all parties involved at different levels.

Firstly, it is evident that the tasks, complexity and scale of the constraints facing humanitarian actors in their efforts to respond to the disaster were remarkable (Telford and Cosgrave, 2006).

In the wake of the Tsunami it is evident from the media that there was a tremendous response from the international community. Notable among the donors is the response of two largest donors in the world, the U.S and the EU that donated $ 350 million and $ 600 million respectively. The U.S went a little further by providing military assistance to the region (Module 4, nd).

The overwhelming response however, ushered in new challenges that needed immediate solutions. In other words, the level of contributions was so overwhelming that it exceeded the programmes of International NGOs as in the case of Médecines Sans Frontièries which made an unusual announcement to suspend contributions towards the Tsunami relief (Module 4, nd). Other challenges bordered on coordination, a very important practice in humanitarian response. This challenge was recognised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Ibid)

**Lessons learned from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami**

As we highlight the lessons learned from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, it is significant to recall that the response to the Tsunami had many “components – from the affected populations, provincial and national authorities and the military, to international agencies and international military” (Telford and Cosgrave, 2006, p. 43). However this response did not come without challenges.

Albeit focus was placed on the role played by international organisations, in many reports, it is important to realise that local efforts equally played a key role in both rescue and humanitarian operations (Grünewald, Boyer, Maury & Paschal, 2007). However, many reports focussed too much on the role played by international organisations; overlooking local effort. Reports also show that there are fundamental flaws made by humanitarian organisations, governments, national and international non-governmental organisations (Ibid).

The first lesson from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami concerns pre-disaster risk reduction and early warning system. Studies show that the Indian Ocean region is at risk from natural hazards, tropical cyclones, tidal surges and earthquakes. The international community paid little attention to this reality and the vulnerability of this region (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006)

The fact that there was no warning system in the Indian Ocean made the situation even worse (Bhaumik 2005, cited in Telford & Cosgrave, 2006) which led to a lot of deaths. The mistakes made by organisations and humanitarian groups are vivid and evident in the manner in which international organisations overlooked certain aspects such as traditional knowledge. Furthermore, the lack of adequate technical expertise and knowledge from the meteorological services of Thailand whose head was sucked due to the fact that he did not issue early warnings (Associated Press, 2005)

The financial times (2005) reports that while parts of Indonesia were struck in a matter of 20 minutes, Thai officials had a meeting to discuss the disaster nevertheless, did not alarm the nation to avoid causing panic (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006). Typically an hour and half later Sri Lanka was hit and yet there was ample time for a warning to circulate (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006).

In the same vein, six months before the disaster, the UN’s Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission warned that the Indian Ocean had a significant threat from both local and distant tsunamis. However, this warning was not given keen consideration sadly (Revkin, 2004).

Apart from that, delay by International Non-Governmental Organisations contributed to the bad handling of the whole situation, especially that the disaster was instantaneous. Uncoordinated efforts, jammed flights to Aceh with volunteers and official teams from all over Indonesia all contributed to the mistakes made in the handling of the Tsunami and whatever was expected of humanitarian organisations in the after math of the disaster (Telford & Cosgrave, 2006).

**Steps taken by the International Community in the wake of the Tsunami**

Awakened to the horror of the Tsunami and the mistakes made by organisations involved in humanitarian response; the international community in partnership with national and international non-governmental organisations, took certain measures to improve the situation (Revkin, 2004), as we shall outline below.

First and foremost, the 2004 Tsunami experience inspired global efforts to do something about disasters in the future. Hence the formation of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, a group of international donors constituted in the after math of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami to assess the impact of the natural disaster (Oxfam Research Report, 2014).

Secondly, the Islands of the Indian Ocean set up three main goals in view of setting up preventive and preparedness measures: 1) Development of disaster tsunami programme with three dimensions: implementation of tsunami programmes at national, regional and international levels and the coordination of all programmes 2) development of an Indian Ocean early warning system, 3) the development of tsunami research programme (Ramalanjaona, 2011).

Furthermore, in the wake of the tsunami, plans came up to prevent further loss of life. Ramalanjaona (2011) observes that “the most studied plans are the Madagascar plan, the tsunami early warning and repose system in Mauritius, and the creation of the Department of the Risk and Disaster Management in Seychelles” (par 11).

The Madagascar plan developed in 2006 is said to be one of the most exhaustive of all national plans in recent times. Furthermore, this plan is deemed a model for other Islands. The Madagascar plan was devised with five objectives 1) development of national evacuation plan on tsunami 2) establishment of early warning systems 3) increase in public and community awareness through the media 3) mock exercises 4) strengthen the operational capacity of national meteorological services to include national warning system (Ramalanjaona, 2011)

Outside of the region where the Tsunami hit, countries that had their citizens affected also responded to the crisis. The French funding for example, focussed primarily on quality than quantity (Oxfam Research Report, 2008).

The challenges arising from funding projects resulted in the strategy to channel international humanitarian assistance through what is called pooled funds. These funds are designed to aid flexibility and speed when responding to crises and to make funding more impartial. In principal, the international community and humanitarian actors had to learn from the 2004 Tsunami experience where funding was concerned. Furthermore, the Tsunami was used as a catalyst for the launch of the expanded UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in the year 2005. In addition to CERF, there now exists pooled funding systems at country level. These pooled funding systems are meant to support most of the UN-coordinated response plans such as the (Common Humanitarian Funds – CHF). Such moves are meant to cushion unexpected needs that emerge outside of coordinated response plans (Oxfam Research Report, 2008).

**The EU and US Relationship in enhancing Humanitarian Aid**

As we begin this discussion, the question is: what makes this partnership between the EU and U.S so strong? This hypothetical question will help us to explore this strong relationship. Despite the many dangers, criticisms and harsh judgments, the transatlantic partnership faces; it has anchored the world’s economic, political and security order for the last seven decades. This makes this partnership one of the deepest and most complex in the entire world. In other words their common interests are stronger compared to what divides them (Lewis, Parakilas, Schineider-Petsinger, Smart, Rathke & Ruy, 2018). Let us explore this partnership in relation to international humanitarian relief.

**The Transatlantic Partnership and Humanitarian Relief**

The European Union and the United States remain two largest leading administrations in disaster relief management. As we know, relief management is one of the highest profile areas of public concern. This aspect remains a part of U.S’s and EU’s broadly defined foreign policy (Brattberg & Rinhard, 2012).

Furthermore, when we examine the profiles of these two administrations, we realise that they are powerful economic blocs equipped with strong policy ambitions and public support for humanitarian relief and assistance resources (Krasner, 1983).

However, the 2010 Haiti disaster was a litmus test on the capacities of these two sides in their participation in international disaster relief (Brattberg & Rinhard, 2012). Before we engage in their roles in humanitarianism, let us first outline the global challenges that these two sides contend with on a daily basis.

**Global Challenges faced by the EU – US Cooperation**

First and foremost, we know that the United Nation’s leading role in building institutionalised cooperation, encourages cooperating partners to assist disaster stricken countries. In this category, the U.S and EU feature highly (Brattberg & Rinhard, 2012).

However, the U.S – EU cooperation is facing challenges such as an increase in anti-globalization, anti-trade, lack of faith in particular governments, institutions and alliances and the widespread geo-strategic shifts. These global phenomena are all putting a strain on the U.S – EU cooperation (Lewis et al., 2018).

On the other hand, the transatlantic cooperation plays a critical role in humanitarianism. Furthermore, this partnership contributes greatly to the improvement of policies and operations and in enhancing coherence of the humanitarian system (Steets, Hamilton, Binder, Johnson, Koddenbrock, Marret, 2009)

Let us cite a few concrete achievements achieved by the US and EU partnership. This cooperation has funded humanitarian projects both prior to and in the wake of natural and made disasters. For example the Tsunami and Earthquake in Haiti as we have highlighted above, to mention but a few (Module 4, nd).

Enhanced cooperation will mean that an increase in integrated economic cooperation in the world which will translate into an increase in humanitarian support. Furthermore, there will be increased force as exemplified by executive orders signed in February and March, 2017. This is backed up by the commitment of the EU and Trump administration that have signalled a strong commitment to the fight against terrorism and global crimes (Lewis et al., 2018).

**Conclusion**

In this essay we have outlined major aspects from the five general conditions to be fulfilled by the Secretary General in carrying out preventive treatments to the definition of terrorism and how it affects humanitarianism. We have also highlighted the lessons of the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. We then moved on to the U.S – EU cooperation; its role in humanitarian assistance and what this partnership could mean if enhanced. It is very evident that a closer working relationship between these two administrations will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, our findings suggest that Humanitarian Diplomacy is at the heart of all the aspects outlined in this essay. Lastly we can conclude that humanitarian response is influenced and threatened by a number of factors that if not corrected, will continue to affect humanitarian practices.

**REFERENCES**

Anderlini, S. N. & Stanski, V. (2004). International Alert, Women Waging Peace – *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace:* A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action. Retrieved from: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ToolkitWomenandConflictPreventionandResolution_InternationalAlert2004.pdf>. Accessed 1st February, 2020.

Associated Press (2005) “Chief Forecaster in Thailand Removed from Job for Failing to Warn of Tsunami”, AP Breaking News: SFGate.com. Retrieved from: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/ article.cgi?file=/news/archive/2005/01/04/ international1227EST0541.DTL. Accessed 1 May 2006.

Brattberg, E. & Rinhard, M. (2012). *The EU and U.S. as Actors in Disaster Relief*, Research paper no. 22. Retrieved from: <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf>. Accessed 17th January, 2020.

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945). Chapter XV*, the Secretariat Article 99*. Retrieved from: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>. Accessed on 9th February, 2020.

Debarre, A. S. (2019). Extremism in Africa, vol 2, *Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism: The Risks for Humanitarian Action*. South Africa: Tracey McDonlad Publishers

Friedlander, R. A. (1976). “The Origins of International Terrorism: A Micro Legal-al Perspective.” *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, vol. 6, p. 49. Retrieved from: <http://www.unodc.org>. Accessed 10th February, 2020.

Grünewald, F. Boyer, B. Maury, H. & Paschal, P. (2007). *Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004: 10 Lessons learnt from the Humanitarian Response*, Groupe URD: Retrieved from: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/430_Int_Tsunami-2.pdf>. Accessed 14th January, 2020.

Humanitarian Diplomacy Module 3 *Hand out*. Retrieved from:

<http://portal.onlineresourcecenter.nl/prolearn/public/login>. Accessed 25th October, 2019.

Lewis, P. Parakilas, J. Schineider-Petsinger, M. Smart, C. Rathke, J. & Ruy, D. (2018). *The Future of the United States and Europe: An irreplaceable partnership*: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Research Paper. Retrieved from: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-04-11-future-united-states-europe-irreplaceable-partnership.pdf>. Accessed 17th January, 2020.

Macrae, J. (1996). Disasters. *Journal of Disaster Studies and Management*, 20 (4), 295 – 299. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/search. Accessed 25th November, 2019.

Metcalfe, V. A. Giffen & S. Elhawary (2011) *UN Integration and Humanitarian Space: An Independent Study Commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group.* London/Washington DC: ODI/Stimson Centre Commissioned Report.

Module 1: *Introduction to International Terrorism, Counter Terrorism*: Retrieved from: <https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/18-04932_CT_Mod_01_ebook_FINALpdf.pdf>. Accessed 14 January, 2019.

Muller, G. García, L. B. Deckmyn, A. Trobbiani, R. & Valenza, D. (2016). Collegium, *Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and International Humanitarian Law*, no. 47, p. 3 – 6. Retrieved from: <http://www.coleurope.eu>. Accessed 10th February, 2020.

Parker, T & Sitter, N. (2016). “The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It’s Not Waves, It’s

Strains.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 28, issue 2, pp. 197-216. Retrieved from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112277>. Accessed 10th February, 2020.

Norwegian Refugee Council (2018). *Principles Under Pressure: The impact of counter-terrorism measures and preventing/countering violent extremism on principled humanitarian action*. Retrieved from: https: //www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/principles-under-pr. Accessed 14th January, 2020.

Oxfam Research Reports (2014). The Indian Ocean Tsunami, 10 years on: *Lessons from the response and ongoing Humanitarian funding challenges*. Research Report. Retrieved from: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/430_Int_Tsunami-2.pdf>. Accessed 14th January, Pantuliano, S. Mackintosh, K. & Elhawary, S. & Metcalfe, V. (2011). HPG Policy Brief 43, *Counter-terrorism and Humanitarian Action: Tensions, impact and way forward*. Retrieved from: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7347.pdf>. Accessed 14th January, 2020.

2020.

Ramalanjaona, G. (2011). Emergency Medicine International*, Imapact of the 2004 Tsunami in the Islands of Indian Ocean: Lesson Learned*, vol. 2011, p. 3. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1155/2011/920813>. Accessed 17th January, 2020.

Steets, J. Hamilton, D. Binder, A. Johnson, K. Koddenbrock, K. & Marret, J. (2009). *Improving Humanitarian Assistance: A Transatlantic Agenda for Action.* Retrieved from: https://www.gppi.net/media/Steets\_et\_al\_2009\_Improving\_Humanitarian\_180830\_112120.pdf. Accessed 28th December, 2019.

Telford, J. & Cosgrave, J. (2006). *Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami*: Synthesis Report. Retrieved from: <https://www.sida.se/contentassets/f3e0fbc0f97c461c92a60f850a35dadb/joint-evaluation-of-the-international-response-to-the-indian-ocean-tsunami_3141.pdf>. Accessed 14th January, 2020.

United Nations Department of Political Affairs (2006). United Nations Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy in Action*. An Overview of the role, approach and tools of the United Nations and its Partners in preventing violent partners*. Retrieved from: <https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/booklet_200618_fin_scrn.pdf>. Accessed 1st February, 2020.

United Nations General Assembly, Security Council (2019). Responsibility to Protect: *Lessons learned for prevention: Report of the Secretary General*: Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_73_898_E.pdf>